It has long been recognised that the rate of return for individuals who invest in education is high. Yet there is an established socioeconomic gradient in educational attainment, despite much effort in recent decades to address this inequality. This study evaluate a comprehensive university access program that involves needs-based financial, academic and social support using a natural experiment which exploits the time variation in the expansion of the access program across schools. The program has parallels with US affirmative actions programs, although preferential treatment is based on socioeconomic status rather than ethnicity. Evaluating the effectiveness of programs targeting disadvantaged students in Ireland is particularly salient given the high rate of return to education in Ireland and the lack of intergenerational mobility in educational attainment. Overall, we identity positive program effects on the retention of students, first year exam results and overall degree classification, with the impact often stronger for higher ability students. We find similar patterns of results for students that entered through the normal system and the 'affirmative action' group i.e. the students that entering with lower grades. This study suggests that access programs can be an effective means of improving academic outcomes for socio-economically disadvantaged students.
It has long been recognised that the rate of return for individuals who invest in education is high (Walker et al. Forthcoming) . Yet there is an established socioeconomic gradient in educational attainment (see Digest of Education Statistics, 2007 for USA; Eurostudent, 2005 for Europe), despite much effort in recent decades to address this inequality.
Targeted intervention programs to promote equality of opportunity by boosting enrolment and retention of these disadvantaged groups are in operation in universities worldwide.
While access programs are becoming increasingly diverse in their approach to tackling the barriers to progression to university and promoting success at university once enrolled, the majority of these programs focus exclusively on financial supports. For this reason much of the evaluation literature, as demonstrated in a review of the literature by Deming and Dynarski (2009) , concentrates on the effectiveness of financial aid programs such as the Pell Grant and HOPE scholarship programs. More recently, financial aid is being coupled with other forms of outreach initiatives such as academic and social
supports. Yet evidence of the effectiveness of these more multifaceted programs is lacking, with only a few rigorous studies adopting experimental designs or convincing natural experiments (see, for example, Angrist, Lang, Oreopoulos (2009) , Brock and Richburg-Hayes (2006) , Scrivener, Bloom, LeBlanc, Paxson, Rouse and Sommo (2008)) This study contributes to the currently sparse literature of rigorous evaluations by using a natural experiment to evaluate a comprehensive access program that involves needsbased financial, academic and social support.
Unlike much of this literature, we are focusing on an access program outside of North America. The access program (AP) operates at a large Irish university with over 20,000 undergraduates and postgraduates. Evaluating the effectiveness of programs targeting disadvantaged students in Ireland is particularly salient given that the rate of return to education is higher in Ireland than in other European countries and comparable to the US (Trostel, Walker and Woolley, 2001) . Furthermore, educational inequality is a real issue in Ireland where, out of twenty OECD countries, the correlation between father's education attainment and their children's education is greatest (Denny et al. 2009 ), suggesting that there is a need for policies to improve intergenerational mobility.
Recognising that this was an issue, and in an attempt to improve university enrolment for disadvantaged students, Ireland abolished university fees in 1996
1 . While this resulted in an overall increase in university participation from all socio-economic groups, enrolment among lower socio-economic groups did not keep pace (Clancy and Wall, 2000) . Therefore the exclusive focus on reducing the financial costs of attending university through a universal program failed to reduce educational inequality. Indeed, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) identified a very high withdrawal rate in a US college despite the direct costs of attending being zero, mirroring the Irish case. This suggests that addressing the non-financial barriers to university success is important. In response to this, the Irish universities introduced a range of targeted initiatives aimed at increasing access for disadvantaged groups.
This study evaluates one of these university access programs which provides financial support, as well as academic and social support at both pre-and post-university entry. It is a needs-based AP which identifies eligible students based on a set of criteria in disadvantaged high schools that are linked to the program. It provides pre-entry support in high school in the form of summer schools, information days, shadowing days and extra tutorials. While at university, a sizable financial grant is provided to the students in addition to other supports including book vouchers, course materials, mentoring, and social activities. Unlike access programs which only target one aspect of disadvantage, this AP provides financial, academic and social supports to students.
There is a very well developed literature that shows the positive effects of financial aid on enrolment to university (for example, Cornwell, Mustard, and Sridhar 2006; Kane, 2003; Dynarski, 2003) . The magnitude of this effect is typically around a 5% or less increase in enrolment for a $1,000 reduction in student costs (Deming and Dynarski, 2009 ). The literature also generally finds that aid has a positive effect on completion rates and graduating on time (e.g. Scott-Clayton, 2009; Dynarski, 2008) .
There is also some evidence that academic support programs, without financial aid, can be effective. Lesik (2006) found to reduce the probability of first year withdrawal by 10% and had positive effects on GPA. These effects were greater for students who received the combined financial and academic supports, yet the effects were for women only.
Another study, similar to the Irish AP's support package, is Brock and RichburgHayes (2006) which experimentally evaluated the effects of a Louisiana needs-based scholarship program on course completion and exam performance of low-income parents attending community college. Students were given scholarships of $2,000 for the year if they attended at least half-time and attained, on average, a C grade. While both treatment and control groups could avail of counselling services, the program group were obliged to attend student counselling in order to receive the financial aid. The results show the program had multiple positive effects, in particular the program group were more likely to be full-time college students, passed more college courses and earned more credits, and were more likely to register for their second and third years of college.
In addition to the financial and academic/social elements of the Irish access program, another key aspect is that preferential entry requirements are made to some students i.e. certain AP students can enter the university with a reduction of up to 20% on the required entry grades. Although this preferential treatment is not based on ethnicity, there are some parallels with US and Indian affirmation action ("positive discrimination") programs (Deshpande, 2006) . Affirmative action programs for university admissions are typically based on ethnicity and have proved controversial in recent years (see Fryer and Loury (2005) for an interesting discussion). For example, one criticism is that race-based affirmative action is seen, by some, to favour economically well-off minority students.
This controversy has led to calls for the ethnicity criteria to be replaced with socioeconomic criteria. The Irish AP, which is based socio-economic status criteria alone, may therefore be informative for policymakers considering a switch away from such racebased criteria.
In the absence of a randomized control trial our analysis relies on a natural experiment which exploits the gradual expansion of the program over time to identify the treatment effect of the AP. The estimation strategy compares students from high schools which were chosen to be part of the AP in the early years to those that were chosen in later years. This strategy is similar to Lavy and Schlosser (2005) which relies on the gradual expansion in the number of schools participating in a remedial educational program in Israel. Our analysis examines multiple outcomes including attempting first year exams, progression rates to the second year of study, and the probability of graduating. In addition, we examine the impact of the program on exam performance throughout university which is often overlooked in the literature, despite some studies finding a high rate of return to university grades (see Wise, 1975; Jones and Jackson, 1990; Schweri, 2004; Bratti, Naylor and Smith, 2007) . The analysis is conducted for AP students who receive the financial, academic and social supports and for AP students who also receive the preferential entry treatment. With regard to the latter, it is clearly important to examine the performance of students who have been admitted to university with lower grades than others.
Overall, we identity positive program effects on the retention of students, first year exam results and overall degree classification, with the impact often stronger for higher ability students. We find similar patterns of results for students that entered through the normal system and the 'affirmative action' group i.e. the students that entering with lower grades.
The paper is organised as follows: Section II describes the access program.
Section III discusses the data used in the analysis and the methodology employed.
Section IV presents the main results of the analysis and a description of the sensitivity analysis conducted. Section V discuses the results and concludes.
II. Description of the Access Program
The AP under analysis has existed since 1997 and its aim is to encourage and facilitate increased participation in university education by students from socioeconomically disadvantaged backgrounds. Broadly speaking, such students are defined as those from a background affected by long-term unemployment, low family income and/or little or no tradition in the family of university education. A student is considered eligible for the AP if their parents did not attend university, their family income is below a certain level and they are students attending a designated disadvantaged high school.
Pre-entry, the program is involved in outreach activities which focus on raising student aspirations, creating an awareness of college, and the provision of academic support for the university entrance exam. The AP visits schools at primary (4-12 years) and second level (12-18 years) and organizes pre-entry orientation programs and shadowing days where second level students follow a university student through a day at university. On a community level the AP gives presentations to parents and contributes to community-based events. The aim of the pre-entry activities is to increase the number of applications to university by disadvantaged students.
There are two types of students treated as part of the program. "Merit Treatment" students are admitted to university through a nationally administered admissions system, common to all universities in Ireland. 2 About 45% (from a total of 100-140 students per annum) of AP students attain sufficient points to meet the minimum points level for regular university entry and are allocated a place on their preferred course in the usual manner.
"Discount Treatment" students (the remaining 55% of the total) receive preferential treatment in attaining their place in university. These students do not meet the minimum points level for their chosen degree course. Instead there are a certain number of places on each degree program reserved for these students. To be offered one of these places they must meet minimum course requirements (e.g. a medical student must have studied science at high school), but receive a concession of up to 20% on the competitive entry points for the degree program set by the regular national admissions system. In Post-entry, both 'Merit' and 'Discount' AP students receive the same supports.
Students receive an extra top-up grant which supplements the regular means tested government grant 3 and in most cases, doubles the amount of financial aid they would ranked by converting their (actual rather than predicted) university entrance exam (common to all universities) grades into points using a common scale. The scale takes the best six subjects and has a range of 0 to 600 in increments of 5. The minimum points level for a degree program fluctuates from year to year. The supply of places seldom changes. Applications are anonymous in that it does not involve interviews or submission of a personal statement. 3 The majority of AP students are in receipt of the means tested government grant.
otherwise receive. They are also provided with a number of post-entry supports geared towards liaising with students once they have commenced their studies. Specifically, they receive free additional tuition (if required), social supports from student advisors, and a pre-term orientation week where they live on campus with other AP students to encourage early social and academic integration. This study is the first evaluation of this program to date and the only rigorous evaluation of an access program in Ireland. The identification strategy, which is similar to that in Lavy and Schlosser (2005) , relies on the eligibility criteria of the AP and exploits the gradual expansion of the program to identify a suitable Control group. The key criterion is whether a student attended a disadvantaged school linked to the scheme prior to entering university. 4 As the number of schools linked to the AP changed over time this enables the identification of the treatment effect. Essentially, the analysis compares the treated students who participated in the AP, to students who met all of the other eligibility criteria for the AP, except their schools had not yet, but eventually did, become a link school at the time they came to university. These other criteria are based on family income eligibility, parental education, and parental socio-economic status. These criteria are relatively straightforward and are discussed in the data section below.
III. Data and Methods
Rather than using a standard 'differences in differences' method which would require controlling for school fixed effects by including dummy variables for each school, we estimate a simple 'differences' model, which excludes these schools dummy variables, but includes time-invariant school quality variables to identify school fixed effects. While we report differences-in-differences results in the appendix which include individual school dummies, we do not report them in the main results as our relatively small sample size places restrictions on our ability to control for initial conditions. A further source of arbitrariness in the expansion of the AP was the introduction of a national access scheme to allocate university places amongst nearly all Irish universities, including the one in this analysis. This major administrative change occurred during the period covered by the data and represents an exogenous policy change that greatly expanded the number of linked high schools that was unrelated to the specific characteristics of those schools. This scheme centralized admission procedures for access students applying to all universities across Ireland. Prior to the introduction of the national scheme in 2001, the university in this study was generally linked with schools in its own defined catchment areas which were predominantly highly deprived urban areas.
Other universities had similar strategies. Students who met the eligibility criteria, but attended schools linked with other universities, could not take part in this particular access program until 2001, yet they could attend the university without being treated.
Likewise, after 2001, students from schools in the catchment area of other universities could apply for the AP at this particular university. Therefore, the date on which a school joined the AP should not be a function of its individual characteristics e.g. school quality, local unemployment rates etc. program. This suggest that Control group students, who attended schools which joined the AP later, are not from school neighbourhoods that are significantly better or worse than the treated schools which became linked earlier.
Apart from being in a link school, there were a number of additional eligibility criteria which a student had to meet. First, parental income had to be below a certain threshold which shadows the eligibility for the regular means tested government grant which is available to all students whose family income falls under these thresholds (and unlike the AP, it is available to all regardless of the high school attended). As family income is not available in the data, one of the selection criteria for choosing the Control group is based on receipt of the regular grant.
Furthermore, in order to be eligible for the AP there must be no previous history of progression to university level education in the family. However as measures of parental education are not available in the data, socio-economic status, which is itself a criteria for program participation, is used as a proxy. The social-economic status criteria for AP eligibility include unskilled manual, semi-skilled manual, skills non-manual, and non-farming agricultural workers. 6 Students whose parents are professionals, employers or managers are not eligible for the AP.
C. Description of Data
We use pooled cross sections of student level administrative data containing information on all students entering the university between 1999 to 2004 inclusive. The data contain information such as student outcomes at university, pre-university academic performance, high-school attended, grant status, the student's age, gender, treatment status, and markers of eligibility such as the socio-economic group of the student's family. Some school-level information was matched to the individual student-level data using a school identifier. For example, census information on labour market conditions, such as average years of schooling and unemployment rates in the electoral district of a particular school were included. School level information regarding exam results and other school "quality" variables could not be included as this information is not available to researchers in Ireland, although labour market conditions of the local area have been included as proxies.
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Broadly speaking, our outcomes of interest measure different facets of academic performance in the first year of university as well as the overall performance of the student in their degree course.
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Specifically we examine attempting first year exams, grade classification in first year examinations, and progression to the second year of study. Table 2 shows the proportions of students attaining each of the first year outcomes for Discount Treatment students, Merit Treatment students, Control group students and the general student population. Table 2 shows that the two treatment groups are slightly more likely to sit their summer exams than both the Control and the general student population.
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Withdrawal from a degree may have long lasting self-esteem and stigmatizing effects particularly if the student has miscalculated their relative ability to finish the program.
However in this data, where the reason for withdrawal is unknown, withdrawal may not necessarily be a negative outcome. For example, a student may have discovered a better option elsewhere in another university course or in employment.
The first year exam results are categorised using the first, second upper, second lower and third categories traditionally used in Ireland and Britain rather than using the exact grades or a North American-style GPA system. A comparison of the British/Irish and North American grading system is provided in Appendix Table A4 . Table 2 identifies a striking difference in the performance of Discount Treatment and Merit
Treatment groups. The first year summer exam failure rate of~50% is very high for the Discount Treatment students whereas Merit Treatment students perform quite favourably compared to the Control group and the general student population.
We also measure performance at the repeat exams. Those who do not attain a passing grade in the summer exams held in May/June may repeat in August/September. Table 2 shows that, conditional on having to repeat the exam, Merit Treatment students have lower pass rates, compared to the other groups, however Discount Treatment students pass at a similar rate to the Control group and the general student population, which is encouraging given that the absolute number of Discount Treatment students having to repeat is high.
11 In relation to whether the student sits the exams or drops out beforehand, it is impossible to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary drop outs in this data as no reason is provided for the withdrawal. We also do not know whether those who drop out are transferring to other institutions or leaving education altogether. We also have concerns that some of those who are listed as failing the Summer exams may have in fact withdrawn by that stage and vice-versa, however we cannot quantify the extent of the problem and nor rectify it.
Progression to second year is defined as passing either the summer exams or the repeat exams. Table 2 shows that both Treatment groups have lower progression rates to second year than the Control group and general student population. However note these descriptive statistics do not condition on prior academic ability, year of entry and the faculty of the student. It is also worth noting that the progression rate of Discount Treatment students, while lower than the other groups, is just over 80% despite that only half of these students pass the exams at their first sitting.
In relation to the final degree performance of the student the outcomes examined are: probability of graduating, graduating on time and final degree classification. The sample size at this point is smaller as many of the students who had entered university in the later years had not been in the university long enough, at the time of data collection, to complete their degree in the normal time-frame. Table 2 shows that graduation rates for Merit Treatment students are higher than the Control and the general population groups and that Discount Treatment students have graduation rates similar to both of these groups.
Graduating late will have explicit costs of studying for at least an extra year. In
Ireland, there is an extra disincentive to not delay graduation as tuition fees, which are normally waived for Irish students, are payable for repeated years of a degree course.
There are also implicit costs of forgone graduate earnings. Table 2 shows that, of those who do graduate, the proportion of those graduating on time is slightly higher amongst both Treatment groups 12 . For those who do graduate, final degree classification for Discount Treatment students compares slightly less favourably than for Control students.
However it is striking that around one-fifth of Merit Treatment students receive a first. 12 Unfortunately it is not possible in this data to distinguish between students who repeat years because of failing exams as opposed to illness or voluntary years out.
Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 show the socio-demographic and academic characteristics of the students broken down by the four categories. Table 3 shows, of the total number students in the sample, the percentage admitted to the university each year. The Control group and the general student population are more evenly spread across the years than either treatment groups due to the expansion of the AP. The number of treated students, both Discount Treatment and Merit Treatment, represent less than 2% of the total admissions to the university each year. Table 4 shows that females are proportionately more likely to be in the AP than the general student population. All students in the Control and both Treatment groups
have the regular means-tested government grant as the income eligibility rules for the AP are the same. For similar reasons, the distribution of students across parental socioeconomic groups is restricted to lower socio-economic groups for the Control and both Treatment groups and is quite unlike the distribution of the general student population.
Comparing the Control group and the Treatment group, Table 4 shows that the parents of the Control group are mostly salaried and skilled-manual workers whereas students in the Treatment groups are more likely to have parents in less skilled groups. Table 5 shows the distribution of students across the university's faculties. The
Control group and the Discount Treatment group are more heavily concentrated in the Arts and Science faculties compared to the general student body as these faculties have lower minimum entry standards than the other faculties. The distribution of the Merit Treatment group more closely resembles the distribution of the general study population, with the exception being a greater number in the Commerce faculty.
IV. Results
The impact of the program on the various outcomes for both the Discount Treatment and Merit Treatment groups is presented in Table 8 and Table 9 . For the binary outcomes, such as attempting first year exams, passing first year exams, graduating and graduating on time, we estimate linear probability models and for the categorical outcomes, first year exam results and final degree classification, we estimate ordered probit models. These models control for faculty, year of university entry, and number of points 13 attained in university entry exams, however only the results for the main outcomes of interest are presented.
14 The impact of the program for both Discount Treatment and Merit Treatment is presented separately; however the same Control group is used in each analysis. Separate results are also presented for students who attained 400 points or less in their university entrance exam, and for students who achieved more than 400 points, to determine if the AP has differing impact across high and low ability students. 400 points is roughly the 75 th percentile of attainment in the final state exam taken by school leavers and is sufficient to enter the two largest faculties in the university, Arts and Science, with more prestigious courses like Law and Medicine requiring well in excess of 500 points.
A.
First Year Exams Table 8 shows that the AP has a positive effect on the probability of a student attempting their first year exams. Overall, Discount Treatment students are 5.4% less likely to drop out before attempting their exams than students from the Control group. While the effect is not as strong for Merit Treatment students, it is still positive and significant; they are
13 Throughout these models we have controlled for university entrance exam points linearly, however, broadly speaking the pattern of results holds when controlling for university entrance exam points using different non-linear functions. 14 The full set of results are available upon request.
3.2% less likely to drop out before attempting their summer exams than students from the Control group.
The results for high (>400 points) and low point (<400 points) students show that the AP has a positive effect on low point Merit Treatment students and high point Discount Treatment students. Low point Merit Treatment students are 8.1% less likely to drop-out before their first year exams, and high point Discount Treatment students are 4.5% less likely to drop-out before their first year exams. The impact of the program on the drop-out rates for low point Discount Treatment students and high point Merit Treatment students is not statistically significant. Table 8 shows that the effect of the access program on passing first year summer exams at the first attempt is not significant for either Treatment group. Table 8 also shows the impact of the AP on the probability that a student passes their autumn exams conditional on having sat and failed their summer exams. Again, the effect of program participation on this outcome was not statistically significant for either Discount Treatment or Merit Treatment students. Table 8 also shows the impact of the access program on the probability of progressing to second year. The overall effect is only statistically significant for Discount Treatment students, indicating that they are 11.2% more likely to progress to second year compared to the Control group. When the results were estimated separately for high (>400 points) and low point (≤ 400 points) students, the effect of program participation remains positive and significant for only the Discount Treatment students. Low point Discount Treatment students are 15.8% more likely, and high point Discount Treatment students are 11.1% more likely, to progress to second year. Table 9 shows that, overall, the entire grade distribution for first year exams is shifted upwards for both types of treatment students. While there is no effect on achieving a first class grade, Discount and Merit Treatment students are nearly 5% more likely to attain either an upper second class grade or a lower second class grade than students from the Control group. Merit students are less likely to achieve a third class honour grade. The marginal effect of the program on passing the repeat exams is negative for Merit students. However it should be noted that in this ordered model we have ranked 'passing in the repeat exams' as a worse outcome than receiving a third in the summer exams, but better than failing overall. Therefore, the negative marginal effect of the program on passing in the repeat exams can be explained by the program reducing the need to sit repeat exams, and hence does not necessarily contradict the positive effect on passing the repeat exams in Table 8 . Overall, both Discount Treatment and Merit
Treatment students are less likely to fail their first year exams than students from the Control group. Merit students are 3.9% less likely to fail their summer exams. While statistically the point estimate is not as precisely estimated for the Discount students, students from this group are 4.6% less likely to fail their first year exams relative to the Control group. Table 9 shows the impact of the access program on the probability of achieving a particular grade for the high point (>400 points) and low point (<400 point) students. It shows that the overall results for grades is been driven by the high point students, with none of the results for the lower point group being significant, while the results for the high point students follow a similar pattern to above.
B.
Overall Degree Table 10 presents the impact of the AP on the probability of graduating from the degree course. It shows that, overall, program participation has a positive impact on graduation rates. Merit Treatment students are 9.7% more likely to graduate from their degree program relative to students from the Control group, while Discount Treatment students are 14.8% more likely to graduate.
Table 10 also shows that the AP has no statistically significant impact on the probability that students will graduate on time. It also presents the impact of AP participation on students' final degree classification. There is only one significant result:
Merit Treatment students are 6.1% more like to attain an upper second class honours grade than students from the Control group.
C. Identifying Suitable Controls Discount Students
As we are comparing Discount students to students who have higher university entrance exam points, one may worry that our treatment and Control groups are not comparable. However this is not necessarily the case as there is an overlap in the support of the entrance exam points for these groups. Table 7 shows that the distribution of university entrance exam points intersects for Control students and all but the lowest achieving Discount students. In some cases we have Control students with the same university entrance exam points as Discount students in the same course but who entered the university in a year where the minimum points level had been set lower by the supply and demand entry mechanism. For example, there are Discount students who entered the Agricultural Science Degree in 2001 with 320 points when the minimum required for the 15 For all of the final degree outcomes we do not sub-divide the groups into low and high point students due to sample size limitations.
general student body was 330, and the following year a Control student entered with 320 points as the minimum required had fallen to 310.
Note that all of our estimates control for the faculty of the student, rather than the individual degree course within that faculty (which will have similar modes of teaching and assessment) which also allows us to identify Discount and Control students with the same points, e.g. in a given year within the Medicine Faculty we have Control students doing Physiotherapy (minimum 500 points) with 505 points and Discount students doing Radiography (minimum 520 points) with 505 points.
However for the Arts degree course, which is the lowest entry course and happens to be the largest course, there are Discount students who have lower points than anyone else in the university and few Control students with similar level of points. Table 7 shows that, in particular, there are large differences in the number of Discount and Control students in the lowest points category. While this will not affect the results for higher achieving student (>400 points), it may downwardly bias the results for the low point students if we are comparing the low point Discount students to Control students who mostly have higher points. This may explain why, in general, we find few significant results for the low point Discount students.
D. Impact of Variations in Financial Aid Package
Unlike Angrist, Lang and Oreopolous (2009), our natural experiment does not allow us to identify the relative effects of the individual financial, academic and social supports.
However variation in the levels of financial aid over time allows us to identify the effects of small changes in aid on student outcomes.
The amount of financial aid made available to each student changed during the period covered by the data due to funding availability. Furthermore the value of the regular state means tested grant, which the majority of AP students additionally receive, To determine the impact of changes in financial aid on various student first year outcomes, an ordered probit was estimated using the access program students only. The marginal effects on first year outcomes of having entered university in a "higher value" year relative to entering in a "lower value" year are shown in Table 11 .
Although the estimated results follow a pattern suggesting that the extra funding was beneficial, the first year outcomes for students who received the high value package were not statistically different from the students who received the lower value package.
Furthermore no significant effects of the extra funding were detected when alternative models were estimated 16 . Clearly this does not suggest that AP's financial package has no effect on student performance, however it does imply that increasing the value of the package from an average of €5407 to €6313 (a difference of €906) did not lead to changes in student achievements.
The analysis rests on the assumption that there were no other differences in the AP's activities in these high value years that may influence outcomes. It also assumes that the unobserved characteristics of students in the high value years did not differ from students in low value years. 16 The results of these alternative models are available on request from the authors.
There are limits as to how much one can extrapolate from this result. Firstly it should be noted that the sample size used for this analysis is quite low as only AP students can be included; therefore the estimated results may not be precise. Secondly, based on the data available, it is not possible to speculate with any degree of confidence if an increase by more than around €900 would have had any effect. Nor is it possible to estimate if a reduction in the value of the financial package below an amount of around €5407 would have any effect on average student performances. However in reducing the amount of financial aid to students, policy makers should consider the effects of such a reduction on student employment whilst studying full-time. Students may enter part-time employment to offset a reduction in financial aid. There is currently no consensus in the literature on the causal effects of student employment on academic outcomes. However Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) were able to exploit a natural experiment in one college and found that employment was harmful for low-income students' academic outcomes.
E. Expansion of the AP
The AP is currently operating on a relatively small scale, representing less than 5% of all university entrants. The effectiveness of the program, as demonstrated in this study, calls into question the possibility of expanding the program to include more students.
Currently the program does not accommodate low income students who attend high schools which are not classified as disadvantaged, and hence are not linked to the program. Table A3 in the Appendix shows the treatment effects of the program when comparing both treatment groups to an alternative Control group of low income students attending non disadvantaged schools (poor kids in rich schools). As these results are largely positive it suggests that expanding the program to non disadvantaged schools may be beneficial.
F. Robustness, Sensitivity and Extensions
While the main analysis does not control for school fixed effects due to the large number of dummy variables that would need to be included in the analysis, Table A1 in the Appendix reports the results of the estimation including~160 high school dummies. In general, these models show that we largely replicate the original analysis, albeit with less precision.
As an alternative to using school dummy variables to pick up school fixed effects we could alternatively use some measure of school quality. However school quality variables are not publicly available in Ireland so it is difficult to ascertain the heterogeneity in the quality of schools linked to the program. In one of the few sources available to us, The Sunday Times Guide to Secondary Schools in Ireland, nearly all of the~300 schools 17 linked to the AP are in the bottom 300 places when ranked by the proportion of students that enrol in university.
As a way of allowing for different levels of socio-economic disadvantage in the neighbourhood of the student, Table A2 in the Appendix shows the impact of the program when controlling for labour market conditions in the locality of the high school.
The results are largely in line with the original analysis in terms of size and significance suggesting that there was no systematic selection of the high schools over time into the AP which would bias the results.
17 Not all of the schools sent students to this particular university in the study period. Table A2 also shows the analysis by splitting the sample into males and females to determine whether the AP has differential impacts by gender as found by Angrist et al. (2009) . Overall, we find that the AP has differing effects on males and females depending on the outcome under consideration. However, the sample sizes at this point are perhaps too small to draw solid conclusions of a weaker/stronger result for one particular gender.
These results are contrary to Angrist et al. (2009) which conclude that the STAR program, which is similar to the AP under consideration in this study in many respects, only has effects for females.
A number of additional alternative specifications were considered. We did not find the treatment effect to vary by the faculty or the geographic origin of the student.
Furthermore, we investigated the existence of peer effects in relation to the program; however we could not identify an effect based on having a high proportion of fellow AP students in a particular course or students from a similar social background. For all of these alternative specifications, sample size may inhibit the detection of an effect.
V. Conclusion
Overall the results indicate that participation in the AP has significant positive effects on several student outcomes. Examining the impact on first year students, the results illustrate that participation in the AP has a positive effect on minimising withdrawal rates.
The program reduces the probability of withdrawing prior to first year exams for low point Merit students and high point Discount students. However, it is important to note that the first year withdrawal rate is very low in general.
While the AP appears to have little impact on the probability of passing the summer exams on the first attempt or on passing the autumn repeat exams, it does have an overall effect on progressing to the second year of university. The effect primarily operates through the Discount students. In regard to exam performance however, the AP has an impact on the first year grades of both Discount and Merit students, with the program primarily benefitting the high point students. AP students who attained more than 400 points in their university entrance exam are more likely to achieve a second class honours grade and less likely to receive a third class honours or fail their first year exams. The AP appears to shift the entire distribution of grades upwards for the high point program participants.
The positive effects of the AP on the students' final year outcomes suggest that the program has a persistent effect. The results illustrate that participation in the AP has a positive effect on student performance at the time of graduation for both Discount and
Merit students: students who participated in the AP were significantly more likely to graduate. The AP only had a significant effect on the degree class awarded to Merit students and had no impact on the degree class awarded to Discount Students. Finally, the program has no impact on the probability that a student will graduate on time.
The results also show that the AP has differential effects across high and low ability students. With regard to first year student outcomes, the program generally had a stronger impact on students with university entrance exam results above 400 points in terms of exam performance, and on Discount students in terms of increasing progression to second year.
Although we generally find positive results, one may ask whether under the counterfactual, if some of the students would have attended the university in the absence of the program. As we do not observe the pool of initial applicants to the university we cannot model selection into the university, thus all of our results are conditional on students having entered the university. We could speculate that the control students, who chose to attend university without the safety net of the access program, may perhaps be unobservably more able/motivated and thus the treatment effect may be an underestimate of the true treatment effect.
One may also argue that the AP's pre-entry treatment may be changing the preentry academic achievements of the students. It is unclear whether the students' high school grades are raised or reduced due to the AP. A student who knows that there is a high probability that he will not have to attain the usual expected entry grades to a particular course may not put as much effort into the university entry exam than they would have otherwise. Alternatively perhaps the pre-entry treatment activity, such as summer schools and extra tutorials, directly raises their exam performance.
While table 8 suggests that there was no systematic selection into the AP over time on the schools observable characteristics, it is possible that the schools which became linked to the AP over time differed in terms of unobservable characteristics. If it is the case that better quality schools joined the AP later, then the students who are currently included in the Control group may also be of a better quality i.e. better able students, if the better quality schools have a long-run unobservable positive effect on their students, thus biasing the results downward. Alternatively, as we control for the students' points, it may be the case that students from better schools may be of lower ability in an unobservable way as their points may be inflated due to a positive short-run 'coaching' effect in the better quality schools, thus the overall direction of the bias is unclear.
Another underlying assumption of the analysis is that the average change in the outcome is presumed to be the same for both the control and, counterfactually, for the treatment group if they had not participated in the AP. We are currently assuming that the school level inputs are constant overtime. However, as discussed above, data on the quality of schools are not available for Ireland, therefore we cannot verify this assumption. For a violation of this assumption to bias our results greatly, the quality and distribution of school level inputs would have to have changed significantly in a short period of time (within 5 years). While we cannot observe this directly, it is unlikely to be the case.
Given that we find the program has a positive impact overall on the students that received preferential entry treatment i.e. they scored fewer points in the university entry exam, affirmative action or positive discrimination does not appear to compromise academic standards. Although the program utilizes a quota for lower socio-economic students, it maintains academic standards through its screening process which uses more information on prior academic performance than the standard screening procedure for the general population. However there are administrative and cost burdens to both the university and the applicants with such a process that may prohibit its extension to the general population. Note that the positive discrimination made by the AP occurs on a relatively small scale in terms of the absolute number of students admitted and the level of grade remission that an individual student receives. While the US affirmative action programs are primarily focused on ethnicity, this study shows that such programs based on socio-economic status alone can also be effective.
One of the key eligibility criteria for participating in the access program is based on the history of education in the family. Specifically, students are the first generation of their family to attend university education. Given the overall positive effects of the program, this initiative has important consequences for countering the intergenerational transmission of educational inequality. By specifically targeting the students of low educated and low income parents, the access program can contribute to breaking the cycle. a Estimated using linear probability models. Marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) reported. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The treatment effect is participation in the Access program. Discount students are those who entered the university with reduced entry scores. Merit students are those who entered the university without reduced entry scores. The Control group include financially eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that subsequently linked to the system. Those from farming background excluded. The base specification includes the following control variables: faculty, year of university entry and number of points attained in university entry exams. Sample size 680 535 512 303 241 183 377 294 329 Notes: All regression estimated with ordered probit. Marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) reported. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The treatment effect is participation in the Access program. Discount students are those who entered the university with reduced entry scores. Merit students are those who entered the university without reduced entry scores. The Control group include financially eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that subsequently linked to the system. Those from farming background excluded. The base specification includes the following control variables: faculty, year of university entry and number of points attained in university entry exams. 1 Estimated with linear probability model. 2 Estimated with ordered probit conditional on sitting final exams. Marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) reported. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The treatment effect is participation in the Access program. Discount students are those who entered the university with reduced entry scores. Merit students are those who entered the university without reduced entry scores. The Control group include financially eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that subsequently linked to the system. Those from farming background excluded. The base specification includes the following control variables: faculty, year of university entry and number of points attained in university entry exams. 
Descriptive Statistics

Sample size 313
Note: Estimated marginal effects in ordered probit model. Marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) reported. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The treatment effect is being in first year during a high value financial support year (2000, 2001, 2003) . The base specification includes faculty and number of points attained in university entry exams. a Estimated using linear probability models. b Estimated with ordered probit. Marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) reported. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The treatment effect is participation in the Access program. The Control group include financially eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers. Those from farming background excluded. The base specification includes the following control variables: faculty, year of university entry and number of points attained in university entry exams. Dummy variables for~160 high schools are also included in the analysis. a Estimated using linear probability models. b Estimated with ordered probit. Marginal effects and standard errors (in parenthesis) reported. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The treatment effect is participation in the Access program. Discount students are those who entered the university with reduced entry scores. Merit students are those who entered the university without reduced entry scores. The Control group include financially eligible students (i.e. grant holders), whose parents are not professionals or employers and who attended schools that subsequently linked to the system. Those from farming background excluded. The base specification includes the following control variables: faculty, year of university entry and number of points attained in university entry exams.
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